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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

WAR CRIMES AND THEIR PUNISHMENT
By

ELBRIDGE COLBY*

N public pronouncement of the spoken word, in declaration
printed in The Outlook, and through the pages of Current
History, Admiral Sims has reopened the problem of atrocities
and war crimes and has caused the editorial writers of our public
press to make many fantastic and unsound statements on these
matters. Now that the heat of belligerent animosity has passed
and the vigorous propaganda lost much of its pertinency and
point, it may be possible to take a saner view and to see where
we stand today.
Many and many a man has remarked that war is becoming
more and more humane with the passing of centuries. Property
was taken and apportioned among the victors. Prisoners were
sold into slavery. But gradually the professional standing armies
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the policies and
proclamations of the revolutionary armies of France, succeeded
in segregating to some extent the combatant and the non-combatant, even the combatant in arms and the combatant temporarily
hors de combat. In 1863 the famous Lieber Instructions issued
for the government of the United States armies in the field set
forth a fairly full and very decent code of conduct, which has
been praised by international lawyers and followed to a great
extent by the civilized nations of the earth so far as to result in
the issuing of similar instructions to other armies. Then came
Geneva, and Brussels, and Oxford, and The Hague. At the
beginning of the twentieth .century, it was perfectly proper to
say that wars were subjected to more regulations and restrictions
than ever before.
And yet at the same time that this amiable development was
taking place, the character of war itself was undergoing a great
change. War was taking unto itself new implements and means
out of the scientific life of the world. Gone were the days when
an advantage in equipment would be condemned as unchivalrous,
like the magic coat of mail that could not be pierced, the enchanted sword that would not break, the charmed battle-axe that
always brought victory, the token that preserved its wearer from
wounds. Secret types of armor-belts were developed and used
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on ships; secret ranging devices were devised and employed;
secret processes in the manufacture of artillery and small arms
were used; better telegraphic communication, better aircraft, better
railway facilities, were eagerly sought. The object was to gain
in advance of the conflict a material advantage that would make
the success more sure. The advantage was coveted, not spurned.
Fair play came to mean merely the absence of treachery.
War was also taking to itself new personnel. The citizen as
well as the soldier was in arms. The nation was "all in it." For
a century and a half statesmen had been announcing their hostility toward the enemy government, not the enemy people. It
was so announced in the continental wars that opened in the nineteenth century, in the War of 1812, in South America in the
dreadful annihilating Paraguayan war, in the Franco-Prussian
War, and so on and on, until President Wilson announced that
we had no quarrel with the German people, but only with a
dangerous military organization. And yet that German people
were "all in it too," as Spenser Wilkinson was quick to admit.
On the one hand were the public declarations of statesmen; and
on the other the facts of the present-the people in arms-and
the doctrine of law that war is not simply a relation between
governments and sovereigns but between each individual citizen
or subject of one state and each individual of the other state. And
this had a tremendous effect upon the character of war and the
methods of its conduct.
Since modern war is a scientific war, we must expect the intricate mind of man to be continually devising new forms of
destruction. Since modern war is a popular war, we must expect
the patriotic partisanship inherent in all democratic nationalities
and the fervent propaganda that rouses the citizens to declare and
wage war, to destroy sober judgment and cause acts which might
at other times appear abhorrent. This character of modern war
must be in our minds when we think and speak of war crimes,
scrutinize those that have happened in the past or plan to prevent
those that may happen in the future. We should not forget the
words uttered by Admiral Dent in London in 1922:
"Where war was carried on by a warrior caste, rules were
generally observed. For the observance of rules, military forces
must be highly disciplined. But the modern tendency is against
the warrior-caste and in favor of the nation-in-arms. To lay down
rules under present conditions makes it very difficult for the military to conduct war humanely. If the national discipline is lowered, atrocities will follow."
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Attempts to prevent violations of the laws of war will be
made by the nations of the world, each in its own ivay, military
efficiency demands control and order, compliance with regulations. Vattel so announced in 1758. General Halleck has so
judged, declaring it is a military necessity that no crimes be committed by members of an army, even war crimes. Washington
at White Plains, McClellan at Yorktown, Oyama at Port Arthur,
all generals in the field, have tried to repress transgressions. And
yet transgressions have taken place. Laws are made to be broken,
remarks the wag. And laws against murder and burglary and
embezzlement are broken from day to day. So it is extremely
probable that in the armies of the future the laws of war will
likewise be broken. Especially is this true, since the armies
of the future will be more and more based upon universal conscriptions and therefore less and less disciplined.
Amid all the pother and balderdash about the so-called "unsatisfactory" outcome of the Leipzig trials of German war criminals in 1921, editorials all over the world, excessive epithets in
the British Parliament, for which Mr. Bottomley was chiefly
responsible, and before the Grotius Society, for which Lord Cave
was responsible,-amid all of this it appeared that two essential
facts were overlooked. One was that one prisoner then brought
to justice had already been removed from his command in 1915,
and tried and sentenced by a German court-martial in 1916, for
the very same offenses. The other was that when the commander
of the submarine which sank the Llandovery Castle could not be
found, the German authorities on their own initiative discovered
and brought to the bar two subordinate officers who were duly
convicted. The law might have been broken. Guilty men may
have escaped. But the law was justified.
The laws of war will be broken. Of course they will be
broken, or there would not be any necessity for setting them up
as laws. But let us not demand too much. Let us not imagine
that words on paper followed by flourishing diplomatic signatures
will of themselves prevent mischief. They merely serve as a
definite standard as to what is and what is not mischief. After
some experience they may be justified, or they may be altered.
Their defect is that they are framed in times of peace, and often
by men .of a pacific turn of mind-or at least publicly interpreted
by such-and that they become effective only in time of war
when national prejudices and passions are inflamed and public
newspapers print or delete as their partisanship or the dictates of
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the state censor may demand. When, in the last decade of the
eighteenth century, we protested against British interference with
our overseas commerce, England maintained her position in fact;
but later acceded to it in law and paid damages. When in the
early months of the late war, the British seized privately owned
ships and the American Embassy in London was flooded with
delicate demands, the British continued their practice, but actually
paid damages in one case and it was understood that adjustments
would later be made in the other cases. In other words, the
sea-going, trading Empire found it worth while, for military purposes, to break the law and to forfeit the penalties. Yet the law
may still be supreme. In general the law acts as a repressive
agency. It establishes conventions. It restrains license.
The law may be violated deliberately by one government. A
member of the army or navy may receive orders to do things
which are in direct contravention of law. As a learned member
of the legal profession said almost a hundred and forty years ago:
"He must not judge of the danger, propriety, expediency, or
consequence of the order which he receives; he must obey; nothing can excuse him but physical impossibility."
This principle has been upheld in innumerable courts from
that day to this. It appeared in the German War Code, and
was the point on which the acquittal of a submarine commander
turned. It likewise appeared in the American and British rules
of land warfare. The conflict of theories appears in Galsworthy's
Loyalties, where the barrister announces that he serves the law,
and the soldier that he serves his country. It is a conflict that
should not be settled too rapidly. In time of war we are likely
to think only of our own country, and to judge our enemies only
by the law, forgetting their own patriotism Which is perhaps as
intense as ours. And I have a sneaking suspicion that the man
at the front is as apt as any to do the right thing, in most cases
at least. As Mr. C. E. Montague said in that excellent volume
entitled Disenchantment which every literate person in the world
should read:
"While a learned man at Berlin keeps on saying Delenda est
Britannia! at the top of his voice and a learned man in London
keeps on saying that every German must have a black heart, an
enemy dog might be trotting across to the British front line to
sample its rats, and its owner be losing in some British company's eyes his proper quality as an incarnation of all the Satanism
of Potsdam and becoming simply 'him that lost the dog.' . . .
How shall a man not offer a drink to the first disbanded German
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soldier who sits next to him in a public house at Cologne, and
try to find out if he was ever in the line at the Brickstacks or
near the Big Crater? Why, that might have been his dog !"
There was a paper signed at Versailles which a British soldier
has called "the meanest of treaties." It provided among other
things for the trial of German war criminals by allied courts.
This was a reprisal pure and simple. It was an act of political
hate. It was as much a reprisal as some of the war-time punishments which the mediaeval chroniclers Matthew Paris and
Froissart record. It was as much contrary to accepted standards of international law as the retaliatory British Orders in
Council against Napoleon which British courts denounced but
found themselves bound to enforce by municipal law. It was in
many of its provisions as subversive of acknowledged principles
as the British bombing of Leipzig which the publicist Holland
said could only be justified as a reprisal.
It had long been believed that members of an army should
be dealt with according to the laws of their own country. So
Saladin treated the Prince of Antioch. Europe held up its hands
in horror when Pizzaro punished the monarch of Peru by Spanish
law for carrying out the customs of the Peruvian people. The
courts of the United States have persisted in holding immune a
soldier under orders on foreign, hostile soil from any but his own
national and military laws. When England suggested that her
naval men responsible for the Baralong incident be tried by a
court of American naval officers, our government declined. So,
it is fortunate indeed that better sense prevailed. It was a German court that denounced the acts of Lieutenants Dithmar and
Boldt as throwing "a dark shadow on the German fleet." The
German acts were -condemned out of German mouths, according
to German law; and no man could say that the principle of the
law had not been upheld. The decision was not a political decision, but a judicial one. As far back as 1795, Ward, the historian of the laws of nations "did not perceive the fairness of considering them as amenable to the laws we choose to pursue or as
punishable for breaches of those laws." If the victor becomes
plaintiff, judge, and sheriff, the standards of international law
will be determined by force of arms alone. War will then indeed
become the sole litigation of nations. A new weapon may appear,
like the submarine. One belligerent may denounce it because it
cannot conform to the previously acceptable and reasonable modes
of use. The opposing belligerent may claim that the laws are
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out of date, cannot apply to this new weapon, and that "military
necessity" permits the new use of the unforeseen instrument. The
idea of the nation that wins the war will prevail. What is that
but the rule of force? It is not a legal precept legally arrived at;
but a doctrine established by victory and by that alone. Had
Germany won the war, the uses of the submarine might have been
as Germany wished. Since England and her allies won, the uses
are limited. And-it may be added-the theory of. continuous
voyage and the abrogation of certain neutral rights are now where
England put them when she was "fighting for her life," and will
so remain unless England concedes the point and pays damages.
This is the crux of the matter. Let these things be settled by
law, neither by pacifist theorists nor by bayonet or shell. Rules
of war must be maintained by each nation as regards its own
nationals. The Versailles treaty contemplated trying Germans
after the war by Allied courts. A five-power treaty in Washington gave "any power" jurisdiction over one type of offender. At
the August, 1922, meeting of the International Law Association
in Buenos Ayres, Mr. H. H. L. Bellot proposed, and secured
the passage of, a resolution for the creation of an international
criminal court for the trial of offenders. To this Sir Graham
Bower has protested. He deems it an invasion of national sovereignty and jurisdiction. He considers it a dangerous feeder
of belligerent animosity and a probable tool for vicious war-time
persecution. His opinion is concurred in by many sensible people,
notably by an American naval officer whose opinions on the laws
of war are often asked and commonly respected and also by the
greatest living authority on international law.
Far better to let a guilty man escape through national sentiment than that an enemy should be unfairly tried by a court with
mind perverted by patriotic war-time propaganda. The military
superior is. the proper judge, and the proper man to see that
justice is rendered. It may be true, as a British court has remarked, that the proceedings of courts-martial are in no wise
analogous to the proceedings of regular courts of justice. It may
be true that it is merely from motives of convenience and decorum
that these courts-martial act to restrain acts of violence in time of
war, instead of leaving punishment "to the casual action of
persons acting without sufficient consultation or without sufficient
order or regularity in the procedure in which things alleged to
have been done are proved." And yet it is even more true that
the honor of his profession and the reputation of his service,
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will make a military or naval man a saner and more desirable
judge in the premises than will the vengeful spirit and nationalistic vigor of the average enemy. War crimes will persist. But
the laws of war must also persist. International prosecutions will
shatter the stability of those laws and offend state dignity more
than will dependence on national responsibility.

